On June 11th, Cyril Hédoin (University of Reims Champagne-Ardenne, France) is invited in the Economic philosophy seminar organised by GREQAM (to 4.30 to 6.30 pm, meetings room, Campus Ferry, Aix-en-Provence). The title of his presentation will be “Against the Eliminativist View of Institutions in Economics: Rule-Following and Game Theory“.
Abstract: This paper argues that most game-theoretic accounts of institutions in economics are eliminativist: they reduce institutions to behavioral patterns the players are incentivized to implement. However, because institutions do not explain the behavior of the agents, they can be eliminated as a concept from the scientific explanation. An alternative account linking institutions to rule-following behavior in a game-theoretic framework is developed. Institutions are defined as epistemic games where the players have a common prior over the state space. I show that the assumptions of common prior and of a commonly known state space in an epistemic game are the same as to assume that the members of a community have a common understanding of a situation. This common understanding has a strong similarity with Ludwig Wittgenstein’s concept of lebensform.
Keywords: Institutions, Rule-following, Epistemic game theory, Common Understanding, Wittgenstein.